Introduction
he problem of "loop flows" or "parallel paths" in the Eastem Great Lakes re 'on required the im lementation of a In many parts of the world, the electricit supply industry is complex agreement invo%ing many utilities[$ g which many forms (separation of traditional vertically integrated This paper describes a technique for utilities into generation, transmission and distribution generators are suppl ' g a particular load, how mudl use com anies, introduction of retail wheeling, creation of each generator is 2 of a transmission line and what i s marcets for electric energy) the goal is always the each generator's contri%ution to the system losses. The introduction of competition and a lowering of the average proposed technique is not limited to incremental changes and consumer price.
is applicable to both active and reactive power. Startin from a ower flow solution, the technique first identifies the Eusses While competition is introduced in generation and retail (or w f k h are reached by power roduced by each generator. supply), it is wide1 agreed that transmission is a natural Then it determines the sets of%usses supplied by the same monopoly and sho d remain centrally controlled. It is also generators. Usin a roportionality assumption, it is then widely recognized that the operation of the transmission Ebmpetition will flourish only if all actual and potential market participants are convinced that the market is operating fairly.
Transparency in the operation of the transmission system is an essential ingredient in establishing this confidence. In this respect, generators, suppliers and network operating companies are likely to want accurate and indisputable answers to questions such as "how far is the power generated by this unit real1 going?" or "which generators are supplying this load?' or even "which enerator is making the biggest use of this transmission 5ine?".
Before the introduction of competition, these questions were of limited and most1 academic interest because all of the power was generatecity the same utility com any or bought under fairly straightforward contracts.
Furthermore, conventional wisdomsuggested that, except for radial networks and other special configurations, they did not have any answer. to be able to Ltermine which generators are sup P ying a America, these questions have had to be addressed m various undergoing unprecedented changes. Whi P e these changes take P K UK ossible to calcu ate t e contribution of each s stem can have an enormous impact on a competitive market.
P oads and flows.
The conce ts which form the basis of the proposed method and the a1 o r i L which are required to put it into ractice are des&%ed in the following sections with the he& of simple exam les Possible a plications are then briefly discussed. Final& the a licabihy of the method is demonstrated using the standard %bus test system.
Concepts and Algorithms Overview
Based on the active or reactive branch flows from a solved power flow or state estimation com utation, the pro osed method organizes the busses and branges of the networt into homo eneous oups according to a few concepts which are introkced begw. Once this organization is complete, it is possible to answer questions such as "how far does the power produced by this unit go?" or "which generators are suppl ' g t E Z 2 F is also possible to represent the state of%e system by a cted, acyclic graph. Further processing of this graph provides the answer to uestions such as 'how much of &is line?" or "what pro ortion of the system losses is produced by that generator?'. therefore belongs to one and only one common The rank of a common is defined as the number of generators supplying ower to the busses comprisin this ctxnmon It can never be Lwer than one or higher than tke number of generators in the system.
The example of Fig. 1 contains three commons:
* Busses 1 and 2 which are supplied by generator 1 only (common 1, rank 1) Busses 3,4 and 5 which are supplied by both generators 1 and 2 (common 2, rank 2)
The domain of a enerator is defined as the set of busses which are reache2 by power produced by this generator.
Power from a generator reaches a particular bus if it is possible to find a path through the network from the generator to the bus for which the direction of travel is always consistent with the direction of the flow as computed by a power flow program or a state estimator.
For exam le it can easily be seen that, for the small system shown infig. 1, the domain of generator A encompasses all the busses while the domain of generator B includes only busses 3,4,5 and 6 and the domain of generator C is limited to bus 6. As could be expected, there is a significant overlap between the domains of the various generators.
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For larger systems, the domain of a generator can be determined using the following algorithm:
Place Note that the "active domain" of a generator does not usually cover the same set of busses as its "reactive domain".
The concept dual to the domain of a enerator could be dubbed the catchment area of a load and is &fined as the set of busses which are reached by power consumed by this load. Its extent can be computed using the same algorithm as above but starting from the load and considerin only the branches which carr power flowing towards theqoad. In the example of Fig. I , &e catchment area of a load connected to bus 5 includes busses 5 , 3 , 2 and 1 and hence generators A and B.
Commons
By itself the domain of a generator is an interesting concept but its a plicability is limited due to the heav overlap of commons is more useful, albeit somewhat less intuitive. A common is defined as a set of contiguous busses supplied by the same generators. 
End loop
Links
Having divided the busses into commons, each branch is either internal to a common (i.e. it connects two busses which are art of the same common) or extemal (i.e. it connects two f&ses which are part of different commm). One or more extemal branches connecting the same COIIU+KHIS form what will be called a link. It is very important to note that the actual flows in all the branches of a link are all in the same direction. Furthermore, this flow in a link is always from a common of rank N to a common of rank M where M is always strictly greater than N.
In the example of Fig.1 , there are three links:
Link 1 which connects annmons 1 and 2 and consists of branches 1-3 and 2-5 Link 2 which connects 2 and 3 and consists of branches 4-6 and 5-6
Link 3 which connects c o m 1 and 3 and consists of branch 2-6
Branches 3-4,3-5 and 4-5 are intemal to common 2. Branch 1-2 is internal to cummon 1. There are no internal branches in common 3.
State Graph
Given the direction of the flows in all the branches of the network, the algorithms described above produce unique sets of commons and links. If the commons are represented as nodes and the links as branches, the state of the system can be represented by a directed, acyclic p p h . This graph is directed because the direction of the ow in a link is specified.
It is acyclic because links can only go from a corrmwn supplied b fewer generators to a common supplied b more generators. TYypically, the root nodes of such a grapz corres ond to a common of rank one while the leaves consists of tKe highest ranked commons.
The state graph of the system of Fig.1 is shown in Fig.2 . Such a small system obviously leads to an almost trivial graph. A mu& more interestin example is given in the section presenting the results o%tained with the 30 bus test system. The inflow of a mmxlon is defined as the sum of the power injected by sources connected to busses located in this armman and of the ower imported in tlus common from other c o m m by links $his inflow is always strict1 positive. For root nodes of the state graph it includes on& the power injected withm the common as there are no imports The outflow of a common is equal to the sum of the power exported through l h from t h s common to commons of hgher rank. The inflow of a common is equal to the sum of its outflow and of all the loads connected to the busses comprismg the common.
Further results are dependent on the following proportionality assumption.
For a given common, I f the proportion of the inflow which can be traced to generator i is x,, then the roportion of the outflow Like all postulates, this assumption can neither be proven or disproven and its only justification is that it ap ears m o r e reasonable than any other ossible assumption fhese other assumptions would mply tRat the power traceable to some generators is disproportionately consumed in the o o m while the power traceable to other generators is dispro ortionately transmtted to other commons Consigring that the definition of a common states that all busses withm the common are reached by power traceable to the same set of generators, these competmg assumptions do not seem to have any reasonable physical basis.
It can easily be shown that the following statement is a corollary or an alternate formulation of the proportionality assump tion
For a given common, I f the proportion of the inflow which can be traced to generator i is x,, then the proportion of the load which can be traced to generator 1 is also x,
T h~s assumption provides the basis of a recursive method for d e t e m g the contribution of each generator to the load in each common Usmg the following notations:
cl,. (1)
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These recursive equations can be used to compute the contribution of each generator to each common if they can be initialized. Fortunately, the inflow of the root nodes of the state graph is produced entirely by the generators embedded in these " m o m . The proportion of the outflow traceable to each of these enerators can therefore be readily computed and propagate cf to commons of lugher rank.
An exam le based on the system shown in Fig Considering that all busses within a common are indistinguishable from each other as far as power tracin concemed, it is reasonable to apply the proportiona ity assumption not only to the common taken as a whole but also to each bus load and to each branch flow taken inde endently withmacommon. In other words, if x,, is the contri ! ution of generator i to common J, it is also the contribution of generator 1 to every bus load and to every branch flow within common J and to every branch flow in the outward links of common I.
Knowing the comnwn to which a bus belongs and the contributions of each generator to each common therefore gwes the ability to compute how much power each generator contributes to each load It also makes it possible to compute what roportion of the use of each branch can be apportioned to eact generator For branches linking busses in separate commons, the roportion of usage should be based on the contribution &he generator to the lower ranked common.
Since it is reasonable to assume that generators contribute to the losses in a branch in proportion to their use of this branch, it is possible to com Ute what proportion of the output of generator IS dissipategin losses in the system.
Applications
Identification of the commons and the calculation of the contributions does not require much computer time and could therefore be carried out on-line (based on the output of a state estimator) as well as off-line (based on the results of a power flow program) On-line computahons would have to be performed every few m u t e s to track the evolution of the s stem as the load and generation atterns change dunng the h y The concepts described in tiis Geogra hically-differentiated spot pricing: the price chargecfto consumers could be computed on the basis of the relative contribution of each generator to their load and the price of each of these generators. Pricing of transmission services generators could be charged for transmission services based on their actual use of each transmission line. Apportionment of the losses. the proposed methd makes it ossible to compute the fraction of a generator's ou ut wfich is actually delivered to consumers In a tp air market for electricity, generators should be compensated on this basis, not on the basis of their output By com aring the contributions to the active and reactive power Rows in a branch, it may be possible to d e t e m e whether each generator is producing its "fair share" of the reactive power needed to keep the system operatmg.
Visualization the concepts of domalns and commons could be used to help operators get a better understanding of the state of the power system It is clear that the application of the proposed methd to ricing problems raises important and complex issues of Fairness Short of relocating, consumers would have no control on the price they would be charged. Similarly, CLAYTOR , . Figure 5 shows how these commons and the 14 links whic join them form the directed, acyclic state Y1-h. Using th information contained in Tab es A 1 an 2, it is then possible to compute the load and the inflow of each common as well as the flows on the links. Starting from the root nodes of the state graph (commons 5,7,10 and 11) and moving towards the leave nodes (commons 1,3,6 and 9) it is finally possible to compute the contributions of the generators to each of the commons. These contributions are summarized in the matrix shown in Table 2 . The sparsity of this matrix is an indication of how much "power rxuxing' takes place in the system at a particular time. It is also interesting that for the commons where power mixing does take place, the contributions vary from almost 100% to almost nothing.
On the basis of this matrix of contributions, it is possible to claim that 16.4% of the 9 MW load at bus B17 is supplied by the generator at bus B11, representin 3.0% of the output of this generator. Similarly, generator R % USENS is responsible for 20.6% of the flow on the line between busses B10 and B21.
By allocating the losses in each line on the basis of each generator's contribution to the flow in that line, it is possible to show that generator GLEN-LYN is res onsible for 60.2% eneration. On the other hand, generator REUSENS grovides f7.3% of the system generation but causes only 5 . 6 h of the losses of the system losses but provides only $ 3.6% of its total
Conclusions
for compubng the contribution of each generator to a given load or to the flow in a line has been described and demonstrated. It is applicable independently to active and reactive ower flows and is not lirxuted to ob'ectively assess the contributions made the Introduction. This methcd could be the system and can answer the rhetorical of the difficult pricing and costing issues which arise from the introduction of competition in the electricity supply industry and to ensure fairness and transparency in the operation of the transmission system. incremental changes. T K e numerical example demonstrates that C a~~~i c a de Chile, Santiago, Chile): We congratulate the authors for an original methodology that is very amctive for its ease of application. The critical aspect of the proposal is that of the proportionality assumption which states that: "For a given common, if the proportion of the inflow which can be traced to generator i is xi, then the proportion of the o u~o w which can be traced to generator i is also xi.". This assumption identifies the method and makes it different to other proposed in the literature.
We are interested in studying in more depth the applications foreseen by the authors and would appreciate their comments on the following questions related to those applications.
1.-Geographically-differentiated spot prices: we agree that based on generation costs, a weighted average of the contributions of each generator to a particular load could be determined. However, it is not clear how line saturation or cost of unserved load would be reflected. Have the authors made consistency studies on these aspects?
2.-Pricing of transmission services: The transmission pricing method can be classified as based on system usage [AB]. We suggest the authors to qualitative and numerically compare their proposal with others being applied worldwide, such as postage stamp and contract path methods or marginally based schemes. Have they done such comparison at this stage?
Can the authors comment on the impact of such pricing method on the expansion of the transmission system? How would sunk costs affect the application of the method in a competitive generation environment?
We would like to discuss the application of the method to ystems, where the method provides interesting 2.1.-Let us assume a radial south-north system (common countries in South America), where two generators inject at the extreme south, where resultant flows are always southnorth The method indicates that lines 11-3 y 12-3 have to be fully paid by generators G1 and 6 2 respectively. Lines 13-4, 14-5, 15-6, etc., This use of locational pricing is important both because of its economic the0 and because of its practical conse uences as it one form or another in Argentina and Chile, Norway, New Zealand and Australia, and is bein proposed seriously in the various power pools in the United gates. It is also part of the recent decision by the California Public Utilities Commission, "A Structure of the Market for California". The challenge is to marry these economically-efficient Iocational pricing packages with access char es that will cover the remaining costs of the transmission g r i f The ri ht approach would sern to be some merger of these locationay ricing methock with flow based allocation methods such as &e one proposed by authors.
is being applie 7 elsewhere in the world. It is alrea 2 y in place in
William W. Hogan (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA):
The pa er summarizes an interesting approach to reducin that might be used for urposes of cost allocation amongst t : e participants in a margt. Although I have not verified the proofs of the method, it appears sound and would provide one way of visualizing the interactions in a network.
The analysis starts from an assumption that there must exist a well-defined and acce table method for allocatin total flows on a network with t {e intent of using these al?ocations for purposes of costin . This is closely akin to many other average cost pricing m&anisms which have been the dominant a proach in re ulated electric industries throughout the world. &owever, witk the introduction of competitive markets, the primacy of place of average cost pricing gives way to the competitive principles of marginal cost pricing. Accordin to these principles, one feature of a competitive market woulf be consistency with least cost dispatch and the use of locationally differentiated prices that represent the marginal cost of load at each location in the network. This, of course, is a completely different approach, again from first principles, which would produce quite different results in cost recovery.
For example, as the authors oint out, correctly, marginal cost covering the total cost of the system. Hence, some other method would be required to recover the total cost. However, it does not follow that the other method must replace locational marginal cost pricing. It is entirely possible, and, in fact, widely recopzed, that pricing mechanisms could be extended to "twopart' tariffs with access charges to recover the remaining revenue requirement and locational mar 'nal cost pricing to provide the correct economic signals. #%e difference in the impact on prices, compared with the allocation method described, can be seen clearly by the simple Figure 1 example. Even though this is an acyclic network, it contains parallel flows. These parallel flows, sometimes described less precisely as "loo flows", are the source of the difficulty in electric constraints on the system at distant locations. Reduction of the network to acyclical directed network, through the creation of "commons" and "links", does not eliminate this loop flow problem, which is the centra1 complicating feature in pricing in a competitive market within an electric network. However, the least-cost dispatch framework, with locational deal with the parallel flow roblem and seems to ave much to The place where the avera e allocation methods, of the type the would be in sharing of fixed costs. Wheaer in allocating the existing costs of the system or in dividing the cost for investments among the various participants in a joint venture, there needs to be some method for findin an acceptable may have the advantage of being intuitively plausible as a way of allocatin joint fixed costs and achieving an allocation which wouh not provide sufficient incentive for any of the participants to defect from the coalition needed to support the network.
A few years ago, Trans Power of New Zealand, when they were trying to allocate transmission and generation access costs amongst the various distribution suppliers in the system, ado ted an algorithm for cost-sharing which is similar to the aut ors in the use of a proportionali assumption to distribute load back through the network to i entify the fraction of each line or transformer "used" by each load. As I recall, they found this to produce a reasonably fair allocation of these fixed costs. However, when the returned to the issue of spot pricing, they used the locationarbased marginal cost a proach as the theoretical foundation of their pricing methodoyogy.
networ t flows to a representation in a directed, acyclical gra f pricing on a spot market E asis would be insufficient for networ E s where prices at one location can be impacted by Ping, does recommend it as a way of ac K 'eving economic efficiency. authors describe, probab H y have their reatest application, allocation. The flow-based methods, such as t a e one described, Although the proportionality assumption used in determining the contribution of each generator in a annmon seems reasonable on a physical basis, it will have to be reconciled with bilateral contracting and wheeling practices. So for example, in Figure 3 of the a er, Generator B may have contracted to sup ly all of the f 0 k W of the load in Common 2 as o posed to tfe 25 MW deemed to be its contribution.
C0"n 2 to su ly loads in C0"n 3. % y d i g g e between 'ph sical%ows and 'contract' flows is the root cause of the loop l o w problem. How can the allocations resultin from the proposed technique be reconciled with bilateraq contracts and wheeling transactions?
Another and even more contentious issue arises in the allocation of losses. In the 30-bus example, over 60% of system losses are allocated to a single enerator. This discusser solution and that an optimal ower flow solution may distribute losses more evenl . kevertheless, the pro osed techni ues such as penalt factors. How can the allocation of total Tosses be reconciLd with marginal loss allocation methods?
Final1 , for reactive power a plications, how will authors extenithe technique to handle &ose cases when reactive power flows into a line from both ends? Manuscript received February 21, 1996.
Simi P arly, Generator A may be wheeling suspects that GLEN-LYN is the slac i generator in the load flow techni ue will produce loss a Y locations significant1 diierent from t a ose resulting from the more Corrrmony d marginal D. S. Kirschen, R.N. Allan, G . Strbac (UMIST, Manchester, UK): Before replyin to the specific issues raised by the discussers, we woulcf like to address a fundamental point which underlies these discussions and informal conversations which we have had with colleagues since the presentation of the paper.
It must be stressed that the proposed approach is not an incremental method, i.e. it does not say anything about what would change if a small change was introduced in one of the variables. Instead, it provides a rigorous and accurate characterization of the flows and injections for a specific system condition. There is therefore no contradiction when our method shows that a particular injection does not contribute to the flow in some lines while sensitivities indicate that a change in this injection would have an effect on all line flows. Besides its simplicity and transparenc the pro osed method has therefore the added advantage tKAt its resuEs are independent of the arbitrary choice of a slack generator.
Application to Transmission Pricing:
A large part of the discussions revolve around the ap licability of the roposed method to transmission pricin f . &le our metho B can be used to compute the contribution o each network user to hysical flow, we do not believe that it provides by itself a t a s i s for com uting transmission prices and charges because it does not ta I;( e into account the cost of providin network securi . Therefore, we do not believe that a detaile8
comparison wit z other pricing methods is warranted at this cost provide economic signa H s which are more likely to lead to detennine the transmission ri K ts which underlie the "contract point.
We agree with Professor Ho an that methods based on marginal an efficient market than methods based on average costs. Locational marginal cost pricing has the further advantage that it provides a consistent framework for handling congestion charges. However, we would like to point out that the proposed method could be a plied to historical records to networks" method which Prof Hogan has proposed.
Developing a pricing system which will provide the long tam incentives necessary to foster an efficient expansion of the transmission system is an urgent, important and difficult problem. Short run mar ricing creates perverse incentives not to expand anal e networ! cost and does not usual1 generate enough revenues to operate and ex and the system 1 method which reflects actual system usage guch as the &od which we propose) could be used to provide these revenues.
Net Injections vs. Individual Generations and Loads
Exam le 2 2 of Mr Palma and Prof Rudnick illustrates that the contrigutions method can be ap lied either to the net injections and separately.
In this exam le, the net injection at bus 2 is indeed zero. On this basis, the ingow and outflow of "man 2 (busses 2 and 3) is equal to 20 MW and generator 1 contributes 100% of this inflow and 100% of the flow on line 2-3.
On the other hand, if we consider the load and the generation at bus 2 se aratel , the inflow and outflow of common 2 are equai to 30 hRW, 2 A being provided by generator 1 and 1/3 by generator 2. The flow on line 2-3 is divided in the same proportions.
at each bus or to the loads an x generations taken individually We believe that treating loads and generations se arately reflects more accurately the physical world and is txerefore "fairer." If the owners of the generator and the load at bus 2 object to paymg system charges on the basis that "they are not using the transmission network," they should isolate themselves com letely f " the system and pay the price in terms of lost reli& ilit y.
Contracts and Transactions
In response to Dr Johnson's question, we don't believe that the proposed method can be 'reconciled" with contracts and transactions which do not reflect the physical world. In fact, we believe that one of the benefits of the roposed methd is to demonstrate the absurdity of some of $e assumptions upon which these transactions are based.
LossAlZocation
Contrary to what Dr Johnson suggests, the fact that GLEN-LYN might be the slack generator has no effect on the allocation of the losses. The proposed method allocates a large fraction of the losses to this generator because a significant art of these losses takes place in a line whose flow is contrhted mostly this generator. As we stressed earlier, one of the benefits of this methodfor allocating the losses is that it is independent of the arbikary choice of a slack bus.
Extension to Reactive Power Flows
Dr Jr,hnson points out one of several difficulties which arise when the method is applied to reactive power: While it is justifiable to treat active power inde endently from reactive power, the converse is harder to just&. We are currently trying to develop a comprehensive framework to handle these issues and we hope to report on our results in the near future. Manuscript received April 10, 1996. to flow in the networ z
